Demographic changes are becoming one of the increasingly important factors affecting the functioning of the housing market. Population decline, changes in the age structure, the shrinking number of people of working age, migration, as well as changes in the size and structure of households are increasingly being analysed not only as social phenomena, but also as factors shaping demand for real estate and, consequently, its value. The significance of these processes is growing particularly when long-term depopulation and population ageing are being observed simultaneously in many regions of Europe. The consequences of these changes will be important for all participants of the housing market – not only for individual property owners, but also for institutional entities. For households, these changes will mean a potential change in the value and liquidity of the assets they own; for banks, insurers, investors or public institutions, they will mean an additional sources of risk and potential costs, primarily in case of properties securing mortgage loans. In this context, it is also becoming important to properly account for demographic risk in the process of determining property value, including prudent value, and in assessing the long-term quality of collateral portfolios.
The scale and pace of the changes currently being observed are not an entirely new phenomenon. In some European regions, depopulation and demographic ageing have already been underway for a dozen or even several dozen years, and their consequences for local real estate markets are subject to analysis and measurement. The experience of these markets can be a valuable source of information for forecasting what may be expected in regions, where similar processes are only now gaining momentum. At the same time, it is interesting to determine not only the direction of change in individual local housing markets, but also its potential scale.
The most obvious examples of European regions affected by negative demographic processes include regions of eastern Germany, northern and southern Italy, north-western Spain and parts of Central and Eastern Europe. In many of these areas, population decline has been ongoing for a dozen or several dozen years and is the result of the simultaneous impact of low birth rates, population ageing and the outflow of young residents.
Eurostat indicates that in 2023 the lowest rates of natural increase in the EU were concentrated, among others, in eastern Germany, Italy, north-western Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania. The example of eastern Germany is particularly striking: depopulation processes began there on a large scale after the country’s reunification in the early 1990s and persist in many regions to this day. In 2024, in the regions of Chemnitz, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Thuringia and Brandenburg, the median age has already exceeded 50 years.
A similar, although somewhat differently rooted, situation can be observed in Italy and Spain. In north-western Spain, particularly advanced processes of ageing and depopulation occur in Asturias and Castile and León – the median age in these regions is already among the highest in Europe and, according to Eurostat projections, in 2050 may reach 59.1 and 57.9 years, respectively. In Italy, the problem is particularly broad: Liguria, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Piedmont and Molise, among others, stand out for their high median age. According to the latest forecasts by the Italian statistical office ISTAT, Italy’s population is expected to fall from 58.9 million in 2025 to approx. 55 million in 2050, with the south of the country expected to lose significantly more population than the north.
The scale of the phenomenon is much greater than just a few local cases. Between 2005 and 2025, the population of the European Union as a whole increased by around 4%, but over the same period eight countries recorded a decline in population; the largest relative declines occurred in Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia. The regional picture is even more illustrative – in 2023, the population was declining in 29% of EU regions. This means that the process of demographic shrinkage is not an exceptional phenomenon affecting individual countries, but a permanent element of spatial change taking place on European markets. Importantly, the experience of these areas already makes it possible to observe not only the process of population decline itself, but also its long-term economic and social consequences, including changes in demand for housing and the functioning of local real estate markets.
The relation between demographic changes and the real estate market has been the subject of research for many years. The literature has analysed both the impact of changes in population and households on the volume of demand and the direct relationship between demographic processes and property prices. Studies conducted in various European countries also show that the scale of this impact may be significant. An analysis of the German market carried out by Christian Westermeier and Markus M. Grabka indicated that in terms of predicted demographic changes, by 2030 declines in property prices could exceed 25% in approximately one-third of German districts. These findings are complemented by the latest Banca d’Italia analysis of Italian municipalities, which estimated that a 10% decline in population is associated, on average, with a decline in apartment prices of approx. 7%. This is also confirmed by broader, supra-regional analyses, including studies by the Bank for International Settlements (Előd Takáts, “Ageing and asset prices”, BIS Working Paper No. 318, 2010[1]; Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, Előd Takáts, “Ageing, property prices and money demand”, BIS Working Paper No. 385, 2012[2]), covering 22 advanced economies, which point to a significant relation between population ageing and asset prices, including real estate. In turn, OECD analyses of shrinking regions show that the consequences of demographic change may go beyond price levels alone, leading to an increase in the number of unused dwellings, reduced investment and deterioration in the quality of the housing stock.
Among European markets, the German market appears particularly interesting from the perspective of analysing the relation between demographic trends and property prices. This is due to the long duration and scale of the demographic processes taking place there, the considerable degree of regional variation, and the availability of housing market data.
One of the latest and most comprehensive studies on this issue is the paper by Philipp Breidenbach, Philipp Jäger and Lisa Taruttis “Aging and real estate prices in Germany” [3], published in 2024. The authors used data on more than 10 thousand German municipalities and analysed the relation between changes in the age structure of the population and property prices and rents in the period from 2008 to 2020. Such a large number of observations made it possible to account for the considerable spatial differentiation of the German market and to separate the impact of demographic changes from other local factors. The results of the study indicate a statistically significant, negative impact of population ageing on both property prices and rent levels.
Particularly interesting from the point of view of assessing the possible scale of price changes are the results presented by Breidenbach, Jäger and Taruttis in their analysis of the economic significance of the estimated demographic effect. The authors do not stop at determining the average impact of population ageing on prices in Germany; instead, they use the variation in demographic changes in the municipalities studied to estimate the effect for individual parts of the country. The results of this research are unequivocal – between 2008 and 2020, the old-age dependency ratio in Germany increased from 30.8 to 34.1, which, according to the model, corresponded to a reduction in apartment prices of around 6.0% and in house prices of around 3.4%. If, however, not only the change in the share of people aged 65+ is taken into account, but the change in the entire age structure of the population, the estimated effect was much larger. Apartment prices were, on average, 12.1% lower and house prices 7.3% lower than they would have been if the age structure from 2008 had been maintained. This is an important distinction because it shows that the impact of demographics on the real estate market is not limited solely to population ageing. The declining share of younger cohorts, which are characterised by greater demand for residential space and a greater propensity to purchase real estate, is also significant.
Even more interesting for assessing the risk of a decline in property values, also from the perspective of the possibility of applying the proposed methodology to the analysis of the Polish housing market, is the fact that there are very significant differences between the areas studied. In the analysed period, the change in the old-age dependency ratio for individual municipalities ranged from -6.4 to +14.1 percentage points. After applying the coefficients estimated by the authors, this translated into a range of the impact of demographic changes on apartment prices from around +11.6% to -25.7%. In municipalities with the most favourable demographic developments, the demographic effect could therefore work towards price increases, while in the fastest-ageing municipalities it was responsible for a significant decline in price levels. The difference between the extreme cases therefore exceeded 37 percentage points.
The authors of the study then used demographic forecasts for German municipalities to estimate the potential impact of changes in the age structure in the years 2020-2050. Assuming that the relationships between age structure and prices estimated in the model remain stable in the future, the average impact of changes in the entire age structure over a thirty-year horizon would mean a decline in apartment prices of around 17.9% on average. For houses, this would be a decline of around 6.3%, and for rents – around 15.1%. Here too, however, the national average does not reflect the actual differentiation of risk. Between municipalities representing the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution of the pace of population ageing, the model indicated a range of the demographic impact on apartments from around +11.1% to -87.4%. For houses, this range is around +6.3% to -49.9%, and for rents – from around +7.4% to -58.6%. Such large values should not, of course, be interpreted as a forecast that apartment prices in specific German municipalities will fall by 87.4%. This is a projection of the demographic effect, obtained by applying coefficients estimated on the basis of data from 2008-2020 to forecast changes in the age structure in 2020-2050. It does not account for the potential for market adjustment, changes in supply, migration, income growth, changes in interest rates or other factors that may offset or strengthen the impact of demographics. The value of -87.4% is therefore primarily a measure of the potential scale of demographic pressure, not a forecast of a nominal decline in prices.
The results of this study therefore provide two different but mutually complementary pieces of information. On the one hand, they show that, across Germany as a whole, the population ageing observed in 2008-2020 may have been responsible for apartment prices being around 12% lower. On the other hand, they show that, with strong spatial differentiation, the same mechanism may lead to entirely different outcomes: from a slight or positive effect in regions with a favourable demographic situation to very strong downward pressure in rapidly ageing regions.
The results of the German studies make it possible to translate general conclusions on the impact of demographics into a more specific regional scale. The point is not to mechanically transfer German coefficients to Poland, but to identify areas that are on similar demographic trajectories. In Germany, a particularly clear example of regions under pressure from a simultaneously shrinking and ageing population are parts of eastern Germany, including Erzgebirgskreis, Landkreis Görlitz, Vogtlandkreis, Zwickau and Landkreis Greiz. In the case of Saxony, earlier forecasts indicated that in 2015-2030 the population of Landkreis Görlitz was expected to fall by around 11-14%, depending on the variant, and in Erzgebirgskreis by around 10-15%. These are regions that had already experienced population outflow for many years, while forecasts assumed a further deepening of this process.
Importantly, the latest 2026 forecast by the Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (German Economic Institute – IW) shows that the consequences of adverse demographics are not limited to a reduction in the number of residents. In a model covering all 400 German districts, data on property prices, demographics, incomes and the labour market were combined. In the most exposed regions, including Erzgebirgskreis, Vulkaneifel and Kronach, real property prices are forecast to fall by nearly 20% by 2035. Other areas of eastern Germany, including Zwickau, are also in a particularly difficult situation. The authors emphasise that the greatest pressure occurs where population shrinkage is combined with a weak labour market and low economic attractiveness of the region. It is therefore no coincidence that regions with long-term depopulation are at the bottom of the ranking. At the other end are German metropolitan areas and their well-connected surroundings. Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt belong to the group of regions where housing demand is supported by employment growth and population inflow. However, the particularly favourable situation does not necessarily occur in the metropolises themselves, but also – and in some cases above all – in their surroundings. The IW forecast indicates that in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, some districts located outside large cities may also benefit from proximity to strong labour markets; in the strongest regions, forecast real price growth exceeds 2% per year. This is an important addition to the picture of the German market: we are not dealing solely with a division into “large cities” and “the provinces”, but above all with areas that are well or poorly connected with regional economic centres.
These experiences can be compared with the situation of Polish counties. At the most unfavourable end of the spectrum are currently areas where the forecast population decline over the horizon of one generation is very deep. Hajnówka County had 38.5 thousand residents in 2024, whereas according to Statistics Poland’s forecast only 25.7 thousand are expected to remain in 2050. This means a decline of around 33% over 25 years. It is also an area with a strongly advanced ageing process already in place – the average age of residents is around 47.5 years. Skarżysko County follows a similar trajectory: over the past two decades it has lost a significant part of its residents, and the forecast points to a further, very sharp decline. Among other areas at this unfavourable end of the spectrum, Hrubieszów County can be indicated; forecasts point to a population decline there by 2050 of around 33% compared with 2020, as well as in some other counties of eastern Poland. In Lubelskie Voivodeship, very unfavourable forecasts concern, among others, Włodawa County, Ryki County and the city of Zamość.
The scale of these changes is therefore comparable with the trajectories that occurred in Germany in regions considered to be particularly strongly affected by the process of population shrinkage. This does not, of course, mean that a -33% population change in Hajnówka County must translate into a -33% change in property prices. The German experience shows, however, that in a situation of long-term population shrinkage, especially when it is accompanied by ageing and weakness in the local labour market, declines in property values of a dozen or even several dozen percent are not a purely theoretical scenario. In the latest IW forecast for Germany referred to above, properties located in regions with the most unfavourable combination of factors are expected to lose almost one fifth of their value in real terms by 2035.
The other end of the Polish market can be viewed analogously. Kraków County had 303.6 thousand residents in 2024, and Statistics Poland forecasts an increase to 321.0 thousand in 2050, i.e. around 5.7% compared with the current level. Another example is Warsaw West County, where the population is expected to increase from 136.1 thousand in 2024 to around 140.3 thousand in 2050. These are also areas benefiting from proximity to strong economic centres – Kraków and Warsaw, respectively – and therefore, in terms of the demand mechanism, they more closely resemble German regions located in the sphere of influence of large metropolises than poorly connected shrinking regions.
If, therefore, German experience is treated as an empirical point of reference, Polish counties at the most unfavourable end of the demographic trajectory may in the future experience pressure on property values of a similar scale to that seen in the German regions most affected by depopulation. In the case of areas such as Hajnówka County or Hrubieszów County, a scenario cannot be ruled out in which a long-term decline in demand leads to a reduction in the value of the existing housing stock by a dozen percent, and in particularly unfavourable conditions even by several dozen percent. In turn, counties located in the zones of strong agglomerations, such as Kraków County or Warsaw West County, should be much less exposed to this type of demographic pressure. This is, of course, not a price forecast for specific Polish counties, but an analysis based on the analogy of the scale and direction of demographic processes observed earlier in the mature German market. Its significance lies primarily in showing the possible range of risk: from regions where population shrinkage and ageing may become one of the main factors reducing property values, to areas where the inflow of population and households will continue to support demand. Only translating these differences into the number of households, the housing stock and the future balance between demand and supply makes it possible to estimate how deep the scale of price changes may be in individual Polish counties.
The experience of European markets shows that demographics is not merely a distant backdrop to the future of the real estate market. In many regions, a process that initially seemed above all to be a statistical problem – fewer residents, more elderly people, fewer households – over time began to translate into real changes in property values, an increase in vacant dwellings, reduced investment and a gradual change in the functioning of entire local markets. The OECD, in its report entitled “Shrinking Smartly and Sustainably: Strategies for Action”[4], points out that a self-reinforcing mechanism may arise in shrinking regions: a decline in demand and property values limits investment, worsens the quality of the housing stock and the attractiveness of the place, which in turn may encourage further outflow of residents. In this view, demographics is no longer just one of many factors affecting prices; instead, it may become a factor that changes the very structure of the local market in the long term. Demographics should therefore be treated as one of the fundamental factors of long-term real estate market risk – a specific risk that develops slowly and can be anticipated much earlier than most crises. Nevertheless, its consequences may be very difficult to reverse.
[1] https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-318-ageing-and-asset-prices
[2] https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-385-ageing-property-prices-and-money-demand
[3] https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/315057/1/10037_2024_Article_210.pdf
[4] https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/shrinking-smartly-and-sustainably_f91693e3-en.html






